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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
17512

-vsHOWARD D. NEWMEYER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged with two counts of
Aggravated Sexual Assault,

(Rape and Forcible Sodomy) in

violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-405 (1953,
as amended) , both first degree felonies.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty
on both counts on November 20, 1980, in the Fourth Judicial
District Court, the Honorable Maurice Harding, presiding.
On December 12, 1980 Judge Robert Bullock sentenced appellant
to an indeterminate term of not less than five (5) years
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T
which may be for life on both Count I and Count II, with
the sentences to run concurrently at the Utah State Prison
{R. 63).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
appellant's conviction and sentence.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The appellant and the victim, Marie Martin, althoug'
not socially acquainted, knew each other because the appellar.:
frequented Mrs. Martin's place of employment and showed her
pictures of furniture which he made in his home (T.26,31,134).
Mrs. Martin became interested in purchasing furniture from
the appellant and on August 28, 1980, she accepted the
appellant's invitation to come to his home and seP the
·1
furniture when she got off work (T.28).
However, ,.vhen Mrs.
'•_,

Martin, got off work that night she called the app~J.lant to
tell him that she did not feel right about going to his home
and thus could not keep their appointment (T.. ;g, 140).

The

appellant persisted in his request that she sc-e the furniture
(T.140), and even offered to pick her up at the Purple
Turtle Drive-in in Pleasant Grove, Utah and take her to his
home (T.30,141).

Appellant met Mrs. Martin at the Purple
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Turtle and they went to the appellant's home and looked
at several pieces of furniture.

As they went into each

room Mrs. Martin would enter first followed by the
appellant, who would turn on the light (T.63).
When the tour was complete they went back to
the living room to discuss prices and terms of a sale
(T.36,66,150).

At this point the appellant told the

victim that there was another piece of equipment which
he thought might interest her (T.63).

He led her down

the hall to the bedroom and then moved aside to allow
her to enter first.

The victim entered and when the

appellant failed to turn on the light, as he had done in
the previous rooms, she turned to see what was wrong.
Before she could, the appellant grabbed her from behind
and took her with him as he fell to his knees (T.36,67).
Mrs. Martin glanced up and noticed that the appellant
had a knife in his hand (T.37,68).
The appellant took the victim's hands and
secured them behind her back with tape (T.38).

He threw

her on the bed and took off her shoes, socks and pants
and pulled her blouse over her chest, then he disrobed
himself and told her to spread her legs and cooperate and
she would not be hurt (T.40).
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The appellant attempted to have intercourse
with the victim.

He did not penetrate her vagina but

his penis touched her vagina (T.41).

Becoming frustrated,

the appellant, at knife point told the victim she was not
cooperating.

He said that she and appellant were going to

engage in oral sex and any attempt to
"would be the end."

bit~

his penis

The appellant then placed his penis

in the mouth of the victim (T. 42) .

When through he again

attempted vaginal intercourse with the victim, and although
there was penetration at this point there was not an
ejaculation (T.42).

The appellant then threatened the

victim by running the knife across her bare chest and 1
once again engaged in vaginal intercourse (T.43).

The

appellant became frustrated and again performed oral
sodomy on the victim, ejaculating into her mouth (T.44).

'r
The appellant got up from the bed, dres.,.ed and
\ '.

asked "Now what am I going to do with you?"

~'

Mrs. J;1artin
OJ

fearing the possibilities responded by saying "God don't
\' ....
hurt me" (T. 44).
There was a discussion ab9-.. ~ the victim
going to the police during which the appellar.c told the
victim that it would be his word against hers if she
went (T. 45).

The victim was still bound and still fearful.

She told the appellant that she would not go to the police
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(T.46), and then attempted to change the subject by
requesting something to drink.

The appellant took the

tape off her wrists and allowed her to dress.
The appellant took the victim back to her
car and demanded that she return the paper with his name
and address on it (T.47).

Mrs. Martin returned home and

found that her husband was angry.

She did not know how

to tell him about the assault (T.48).

She washed and

went to bed but did not sleep (T.49).

The next morning

Mr. Martin left the house without speaking to her so
again she was unable to tell him what had happened to her
(T.49).

Shortly after her husband left she received a

phone call from a friend of her husband.

The friend

sensed something was wrong (T.50) and called back later
in the morning to see if she was alright.

When Mrs.

Martin told him that she needed to talk to someone he
came to the home accompanied by his wife.

The two of

them listened to Mrs. Martin and then they gave her
alternatives for dealing with the attack.

They also

contacted Mr. Martin and helped her to break the news
to him (T.49-52).

Mrs. Martin went to the hospital where

tests were taken at 2:00 p.m., August 29, 1980, approximately
12 hours after the rape and sodomy occurred.
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At trial the defendant took the stand and testified in
his own behalf.

During cross-examination by the prosecution

the court questioned the defendant in order to clarify
his testimony (T.151).

The appellant objected to the

questioning and his objection was overruled.
jury had retired the appellant moved for

~

After the

mistrial due

to the judge's questioning of the defendant and this was
denied.
The appellant also moved for a mistrial on the
basis of alleged errors by the prosecutor in his closing
argument, which was not transcribed.

This motion was also

denied by the court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES THE TRIAL COURl
MAY QUESTION WITNESSES; IN THIS CASE TH~
1·
COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED THAT RIGHT.
.~

. .

, on appeal appellant alleges that the questo:oning
of the defendant by the trial court was prejudici~1·and
should be the basis of reversal of his com,·~
rape and forcible sodomy.

.ions for

'1

During the prosecution's

questioning of the defendant, questions similar to those
asked by the judge were asked.

The defendant did not

respond to a question, and the judge upon completion of
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the questioning of the defendant by both parties,
questioned to the defendant.

Respondent submits that

these questions were within the trail court's prerogative
and were not prejudicial or the basis upon which the
appellant's convictions may be reversed.
In order to determine whether the questioning
was in fact prejudicial it is necessary to read the
questions in context.

Prior to the judge's questioning

the prosecutor conducted the following examination of
the appellant.

Q.

Did you have a knife on you at the time?

A.

I don't carry a knife.

I had no reason to

carry a knife.

Q.

Where was it?

A.

Where· was it?

Q.
A.

Where was it?

Q.
A.
Q.

On the shelf?

The knife was in the closet.
The closet where Detective Blackhurst indicates
Q.
he found it?
A.
That is true.
That is right.
Did you take a look at State's Exhibit No. 3

when I showed it to your counsel, the one right in
front of you, the picture?
A.

It's a picture.

Q.

Do you see a closet door there?
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r
A.
Q.

Yes, I see the closet door there.
It's closed, isn't it?

A.

That is correct.
It customarily remains closed in your
residence, doesn't it?

Q.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you have any furniture in there that

you wanted to show Mrs. Martin?
close~.

A.

I had no reason to show Miss Martin my

Q.
A.

She never looked in your closet, did she?
She had no reason to.

Q.

You were with her all the time she was in

the house, weren't you?
A.

That is correct.

Q.

She didn't look in that closet, did she?

A.

No, she didn't.

T.141-142; and
Q.

You keep your camping gear, as you testified

to, stored underneath the basement staircase, righ:
A.

Yes.

Q.

You have got butcher knives and chE(e.se
'•_,

knives and other knives in the kitchen,
'A.

Q.

~ight?

I don't own a butcher knife.

01

Carving knives?

~he

kitchen?

Do you keep them ip

Is that your testimony?-

Yes.
'1
Keep them in the drawers?
A.
I keep one in the drawer and keep the other
one underneath the snack bar on the cheese block,

A.
Q.
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Q.

Marie didn't go underneath the snack

bar and the cheese block or any drawers to
look at any of your knives, did she, while
you were present?
A.

No, she didn't.

Q.
She didn't go in the closet and look at
a knife?
A.

(No response.)

T.151.

As a result of the appellant's lack of response
to this last question there was an obscurity in the testimony
of the appellant.

It was this obscurity which prompted the

court to ask:

Q.

Where was it you said you kept this knife?

A.

The one there, Your Honor?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Up in the closet.

Q.
A.

You didn't show it to Marie?
No, not at all.

In fact all the knives in

the house really are not in a visible viewpoint
at all.

They are either in drawers or attached

to equipment. They were not visible at all.
Q.
Have you ever shown it to her at any time?
A.
Q.

No, Your Honor. No.
How do you account for the fact she told the

officers the next day what kind of a knife it was?
A.

I cannot account for that.

I know the

officers asked me if I had one like it.

I have no

way of accounting for that, Your Honor.
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Read in context, it is clear that the questions asked
by the trial judge lack the prejudicial characterization
of the appellant's brief.
Moreover, the test for determining whether the
trial court acted properly in questioning a witness as
based on case law and corrunon sense does no~ include
subjective characterizations of judicial demeanor, tone
and voice inflictions which cannot be supported by the
record on appeal.
In State v. Mellen, 583 P.2d 46 (Utah 1978),
this Court sustained the appellant's conviction for
aggravated sexual assault despite questioning by the trial
court of a witness.

In that case the Court noted that

there is a requirement that a judge maintain an attitude
of neutrality.

This Court also stated:
}

Notwithstanding what has just been said,,
the judge does have a function beyond
i._.
sitting as a comparatively silent monito~
In order to discharg~l
1 of the proceedings.
his responsibility of carrying out the
above stated objective, it is within hisi ·:c·
prerogative to ask whatever questi.~ .s of
witnesses as in his judgment is n~- ssary
or desirable to clarify, explain or·add
to the evidence as it relates to the
disputed issues.
Id. at 48 (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
See also, State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936);

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

State v. Gleason, 86 Utah 26, 40 P.2d 222 (1935); State
v. Garret, 595 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. 1980).

Similarly in this

case the court's questioning was directed at making clear,
points in evidence.

The record does not support appellant's

claim of prejudice, and the trial court was properly
exercising its prerogative to question witnesses.
In Hernandez v. State, 490 P.2d 1245 (Nevada
1971) , the court affirmed questioning by a trial court
where:
. . . the questions asked by the court
were merely repetitive of those asked
by counsel; no new avenues were opened
by this questioning.
Id. at 1247.
The present case presents the same type of questioning
by the court.

The court's questions were similar to the

prosecutor's; they examined subject matter which had been
reviewed by the State and they opened no "new avenues."
Recognizing that the permissible scope of questioning
by a court is narrow, if the trial court was in error in
asking the defendant questions the error was not prejudicial
to the appellant's right to a fair trial, and thus it does
not justify reversal of the appellant's conviction.

Under

Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1:
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After hearing an appeal the court must give
judgment without regard to errors or defects
which do not affect the substantial rights
of the parties.
If error has been committed,
it shall not be presumed to have resulted in
prejudice.
The court must be satisfied
that it has that effect before it is warranted
in reversing the judgment.
In State v. Kazda, 550 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975), this Court
stated that error which had a substantial effect upon
defendant's right to a fair trial would be that:
. in the absence of the error there is
a reasonable likelihood that there would
have been a different result.
Id. at 950.
If the court had not questioned the appellant in this case
the same evidence would have gone to the jury.

The alleged

error occurred after the prosecution had rested and the
elements of the offense had been established.

Furthermore,

the court mitigated any damage which may have occurred as
a result of his questioning by issuing jury instruction
No.

18:

Cl

If during this trial, the Court has:' said
or done anything which has suggest" i to you
that it is inclined to favor the ~ - '.ims or
position of either party, you will 'not permit
yourselves to be influenced by any such
suggestion.
The Court has not intended to indicate
any opinion as to which witnesses are, or are
not, worthy of belief, nor which party should
prevail.
If any expression has seemed to

-12-
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indicate an opinion relating to any of
these matters, you should disregard it,
because you are the exclusive judges
of the facts.
(R. 50).

In s? stating the court specifically admonished
the jury that they and not he, were the exclusive judges
of the facts, and credibility of all witnesses.

Thus in

accordance with § 77-42-1 this Court should not presume
prejudice.

The questioning when read in context does not

establish a basis for reversal of the appellant's conviction
since it was merely an attempt to "clarify an obscurity"
and thus within the trial court's prerogative.
POINT II
WHERE ALLEGED ERROR BY THE PROSECUTOR
IN CLOSIHG ARGUMENT WAS NOT PRESERVED
IN THE RECORD THERE IS NOTHING TO
REVIEW ON APPEAL.
The appellant alleges that the trial court erred
in refusing to grant his motion for mistrial based on
alleged errors of the prosecution in its closing argument
to the jury.

The argument was not transcribed.

The motion

which was made after the jury retired was properly denied
by the trial court.

In this case the trial court is the

only court which was able to analyze what was said and the
effect, if any of those statements.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

r

Appellant correctly cites the test to determi~
if remarks made by counsel in arguments require reversal.
In State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1973) this Court
stated:
Counsel for both sides have considerable
latitude in their arguments to the jury;
they have a right to discuss fully from
their standpoints the evidence 'and the
inferences and deductions arising therefrom.
The test of whether the rer..arks made by
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a
reversal in a criminal case is, did the
remarks call to the attention of the juror
matters which they would not be justified
in considering in determining their verdict,
and were they, under the circumstances of
the particular case, probably influenced by
those remarks.
The determination of whether
the improper remarks have influenced a
verdict is within the sound discretion of
the trial court on motion for new trial.
If there is no abuse of this discretion and
substantial justice appears to have been
done, the appellate court will not reverse
the judgment.
413 P.2d 422, 426.

I.

It is recognized that on appeal "this

Co~rt
C1

is

not inclined to reverse a conviction on matters dehors
the record."
1965).

State v. Starlight Club, 406

!'· .-d 912,

913 (V'.-

In State v. Langley, 371 P.2d 586 (Ar'.iz. 1962) thee'

stated that it "should only review those matters appearing
in the trial court's records. "

Other states have specificaL

refused to review on appeal issues of prosecutorial errM

-14-
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where the transcript does not contain the arguments and
objections raised in the trial court.

See State v.

Standley, 586 P.2d 1075 (Mont. 1978); Lewis v. State,
572 P.2d 211 (Nev. 1977); State v. Halloway, 219 Ka. 245,
547 P.2d 741 (1976); and Diebold v. People, 485 P.2d 900
(Colo. 1971).
Without a record, this Court must rely on the
wisdom of the trial court which was the only court which
was able to ascertain whether the alleged error of the
prosecutor justified a mistrial.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
SUFFICIENT FOR REASONABLE MINDS TO
HAVE FOUND APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated
sexual assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-405
(1953, as amended), which provides:

'cc

aL

(i)
A person commits aggravated sexual
assault if: (a) in the course of a rape or
attempted rape or forcible sodomy or attempted
forcible sodomy;
(ii)
The actor compels submission to the
rape or forcible sodomy by threat of kidnapping,
death or serious bodily injury to be inflicted
imminently on any person.
Forcible Sodomy is defined in § 76-5-403:
(1)
A person commits sodomy when.he engages
in any sexual act involving the genitals of one
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.,

person and the mouth or anus of another
person, regardless of the sex of either
participant.
(2)
A person commits forcible sodomy
when he commits sodomy upon another
without the other's consent.
In the trial court appellant proceeded on the theory that
there was no vaginal intercourse, only oral sodomy to whic'
he claimed the victim consented (T.129).

Appellant appeac

to argue in his brief that the evidence presented at triai
indicates that the victim consented both to intercourse
and sodomy.

While defendant is entitled to present his

theory of the case to the jury, he can not advance that
theory for the first time on appeal.

Therefore, the appeL

may not, on appeal, raise for the first time the issue of
consent as to the sexual intercourse.

State v. Treadway,

28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846 (1972).
However, if this Court should choose to 'rexamine
I

the issue of consent as to the rape charge the appellant's
.~

claim that the evidence established at trial was "i1ih\erent'..
incredible" and thus not sufficient for reasonable:· fflihds
to conclude that appellant was guilty beyor,._

' reasonable
'1

doubt is without merit.

The evidence presented below

when read in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict
was sufficient to establish that the appellant committed
forcible rape and forcible sodomy upon the victim, Mrs, Mar:
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In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence to support
a jury verdict it is well established that:
The weight of evidence and the
credibility of witnesses are reserved
exclusively for the jury, and this Court
will not interfere unless the evidence
is found to be so lacking and insubstantial
that reasonable men could not possibly
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Nor will we weigh conflicting
evidence, the credibility of witnesses,
or the weight to be given appellant's
testimony.
Further, unless there is a
clear showing of lack of evidence, the
jury verdict will be upheld.
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980), See also
State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 813-814 (Utah 1977); State
v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976); State v. Fort, 572 P.2d
1387 (Utah 1977); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977);
and State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 750 (Utah 1977).
In the case of State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700
(Utah 1977) , this Court stated that where the question of
guilt or innocence depends upon weighing the credibility
of the victim against that of the accused:
The rule is that if there is
nothing so inherently incredible
about the victim's story that
reasonable minds would reject it,
a conviction may rest upon her
testimony alone.
Id at 702.
In the present case there is nothing so inherently
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incredible about the victim's story that reasonable
minds would reject it.

Mrs. Martin testified at trial

that she went to the home of the appellant in order to
look at furniture which she was interested in purchasing
(T.28,136).

The evidence also establishes that there

was no prior social contact between the viptim and the
appellant as they had never dated and had only met in
a business setting (T.26,31,134).

The victim attempted

to get out of the arranged meeting by calling appellant
to tell him she could not make it but the appellant
convinced her to come and look at the furniture (T.29,
140).

Because she didn't know where the appellant's

residence was located she met him and left her car at
a local drive-in thus retaining no method of escape (T,29,
141).
f

They went to the appellant's home and hoked at
!

furniture.

There is no discrepancy in the testimo~y of
Cl

I

either witness until the time when they entered the
bedroom of the appellant.

The appellant cla1 1s that the

victim willingly consented, even suggested thctt they
· sod omy (T . 153) .
engage in

In contrast, the victim's
.1

version of the evening, which is supported by circumstantia
evidence, is that when they entered the bedroom the
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'
appellant grabbed her from behind and then taped her
mouth and bound her hands (T.37,38).

This is substantiated

by the red marks on her wrists noted by the police officer,
the nurse, and the doctor (T.101,115,124) and by the
bruise on her neck which was noted by the nurse (T.115).
At knife point the victim was told to cooperate and she
would not be hurt (T.38,40).

The appellant then threw

the victim on the bed and took off her shoes and pants,
and pulled her shirt and bra over her chest (T.40).

He

attemnted to force himself into the victim, and althouqh
he did not penetrate there was touchinq of his penis and
her vagina (T.41).

The appellant then told the victim

that he was going to perform oral sodomy upon her and any
attempt to bite him ''would be the end" IT. 421.

He then

r11bbed the knife across the chest of the victim, and
engaged in vaginal intercourse and although there was
penetration he did not ejaculate at that time (T.43).
Appellant once again performed oral sodomy on the victim
and ejaculated in her mouth (T.44), while holding the
knife to her throat (T.43).
These events were sufficient to establish that
the rape and sodomy did in fact occur without the victim's
consent.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406 (1953, as amended)'
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provides that an act of sexual intercourse takes place
without the victim's consent i'n ei'ther of the f o 11 owing
·
circumstances:
(1) When the actor compels the victim
to submit or participate by force that
overcomes such earnest resistance as
might reasonably be expected under the
circumstances; or
(2)
The actor compels the victim to
submit or participate by any threat that
would prevent resistance by a person of
ordinary resolution .
Applvinq this standard in State v. Herzoq, 610 P.2d 1281,
1283 (Utah 1980), this Court stated:
The determination of whether
consent was Present or absent in anv
criven case is factual in nature. and
is thus a matter for determination by
the finder of fact.
Accord:

State v. Meyers, 606 P.2d 250 (Utah 1980).

In this case the victim acquieced in the sexual arts undN

't

threats by the appellant which were accompanied b1 use of
I ..
a knife.
This was sufficient to prevent the victi~'s
Cl

escape or .resistence, and thus the fact that there was no
attempt to escape is not determinative.

App,E ;lant has fail::

show that the jury's verdict was based on suc~r unsubstantial
evidence that reasonable minds could not possibly find
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
supra.

State v. Wilson,

The jury heard the witnesses and saw the evidence

-20-
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introduced.

It was their prerogative to weigh the

evidence and attach credibility to the witnesses'
testimony as they saw fit.

In this case, it is neither

inconsistent nor unreasonable for the jury to have
found the appellant guilty of rape and forcible sodomy,
and this Court should not set aside the jury's verdict.
CONCLUSION
The trial court has considerable discretion
in questioning witnesses in order to clarify testimony
or elicit the truth and it is only when this discretion
is clearly abused as demonstrated by an objective reading
of the transcript, that a conviction may be reversed.
In this case there was no abuse of this discretion and any
error that may have occurred was harmless and cured by
jury instruction No. 18 which admonished the jury not
to be influenced by statements of the judge.
The appellant's attempt to allege error as a
result of the closing argument of the prosecution must
fail because there is nothing in the record upon which
this Court may determine if an abuse occurred.

In such

instances the Court should defer to the ruling of the
trial court in refusing to grant a mistrial since they
possess an ability to weigh prejudicial effect of the
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alleged errors.
Finally, the appellant's contention that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain the appellant's
convictions is without merit.

The evidence viewed in

the light most favorable to the jury's verdict establi~u
that Mrs. Martin submitted to intercourse ,and sodomy
only after she was bound and threatened by words an~ by
use of a knife.

Therefore the issue of consent is resolved

under Section 76-5-406, which states that intercourse and
sodomy is without consent if the actor compels the victim
to submit to intercourse by threatening her or by overcoming a reasonable amount of resistence by force.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
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